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SECTION 1983 & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: QUALIFYING THE
DEATH OF DUE PROCESS AND AMERICA’S MOST
VULNERABLE CLASSES SINCE 1871. CAN IT BE FIXED?
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[O]nly those who are required to justify freedom
can fully understand it.
—Henry Steele Commager
Freedom, Loyalty, Dissent1
Police and excessive use of force have grappled with an inextrica-
ble bond since the inception of modern policing. Boston demonstrated
this in 1838 with the establishment of our first American police
department.2 At this early stage in American policing, recent immi-
grants from European countries bore the brunt of harsh treatment
1. HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, FREEDOM, LOYALTY, DISSENT 3 (1954).
2. Katie Nodjimbadem, The Long, Painful History of Police Brutality in the U.S.,
SMITHSONIAN (July 27, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution
/long-painful-history-police-brutality-in-the-us-180964098 [https://perma.cc/C9ZL-JLUV].
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and bias in policing tactics.3 However, police soon focused their un-
wanted attentions on African Americans migrating north in search of
refuge from the horrors of post–Civil War life in the Jim Crow south.4
While violence has always factored into American policing, the actual
debate about the role of police officers and their propensity towards
violence surfaced in the 1960s, when Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s
1963 “March on Washington” captivated America with its demand
for “an End to Police Brutality Now!”5
The tumultuous and inequitable history of our nation necessi-
tated the establishment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, promulgating civil action
for deprivation of rights.6 Congress passed the ancestor of Section
1983, Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (KKK Act), over 100
years ago following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
The KKK Act enforced the newly enacted constitutional rights of
African Americans.8 From there, the modern form of the statute, Sec-
tion 1983, came to fruition.9 Section 1983 contains much of the same
language and declares that the public can sue state and local govern-
ment officials for monetary damages in their individual capacity if
they violate a person’s constitutional rights while performing actions
in their official capacity.10 “Qualified immunity protects government
officials from such lawsuits” only in cases of a violation of “clearly
established” law, federally or in constitutional rights.11
Recently, qualified immunity has protected police officers ac-
cused of using excessive force, specifically in cases such as Kisela v.
Hughes.12 In that case, officer Andrew Kisela shot Amy Hughes while
on duty in Tucson, Arizona, after he and two other officers responded
to calls of a woman engaging in erratic behavior with a knife.13 Offi-
cer Kisela remained on scene for about a minute, when he thought




6. A Short History of Section 1983 and the Struggle for Prisoners’ Rights, JAILHOUSE
LAW’S HANDBOOK, http://jailhouselaw.org/monitoring-your-lawyer-and-case [https://per
ma.cc/XVB3-7FLW] (last updated 2010).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
10. Id.
11. Lisa Soronen, Qualified Immunity Ruling for Police Officer Causes a Stir, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/04/10/qualified-immunity
-ruling-for-police-officer-causes-a-stir.aspx [https://perma.cc/9XTS-PLZB].
12. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018).
13. Id. at 1150.
14. Id. at 1151.
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Hughes had ignored two previous commands to drop the weapon.15
Instead of continuing to attempt to control the situation with more
verbal commands, Kisela shot Hughes, begging the question of
whether Kisela’s actions violated clearly established law.16 Notice
that, in accordance with qualified immunity’s elements, this ques-
tion differs significantly from the average person’s usual question
of whether the situation warranted deadly force.
The Ninth Circuit originally ruled that Kisela used unreasonable
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and denied him quali-
fied immunity, determining that his actions constituted an obvious
constitutional violation.17 However, the Supreme Court overturned
this decision, implicitly highlighting that they had not previously es-
tablished this law.18 Because of the constant onslaught of new police
brutality cases and the relatively new decision in Kisela v. Hughes,
this particular topic has failed to receive the spotlight it deserves,
though some state judges have since protested the Supreme Court’s
decision in Kisela, specifically and in other cases with similar out-
comes.19 In particular, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern District of
New York spoke out on Kisela shortly after the decision.20
For this Note, I will demonstrate how disproportionately the
recent decision impacts people of color in that, with certain races,
courts more frequently find vagueness in whether the officer denied
the person of their constitutional rights and whether the situation
warranted their violence. With discord between state courts, federal
courts, and the Supreme Court,21 we must re-evaluate what quali-
fies as an obvious legal violation, considering the history of police
brutality in America and how that [dis]colors the present decision.
I will also proffer solutions on how to remedy the dissonance
between actually protecting our uniformed officers and condoning
intolerance under the guise of “protecting officers.”22 Previously prof-
fered solutions to this plight include the following:(1) using an exclu-
sionary rule as an alternative to or a sword with § 1983; (2) applying
sanctions elaborated on by statutory provisions similar to Rule 11
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1154–55.
17. Id. at 1151.
18. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1155.
19. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, The 96-Year-Old Brooklyn Judge Standing Up to the Su-




21. See Soronen, supra note 11.
22. See infra Part IV.
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;(3) instituting strict liability
to all claims to ensure we hold someone responsible; and (4) shifting
the burden of determining “clearly established” from judge to jury.23
These solutions have established issues, ultimately disqualify-
ing them from becoming the ultimate resolution. The proper course
of action could involve a reversion to Saucier’s rule of determining the
constitutional violation first to force the court into creating precedent
and, therefore, clearly established law.24 However, a middle-ground
solution could also involve following Cugini v. City of New York’s re-
cent decision, where the court did not determine whether a violation
existed first, but still created precedent by adding a third step to the
qualified immunity analysis: the court’s judgment that these pleaded
facts will not automatically give rise to dismissal on qualified immu-
nity grounds in future cases.25 Additionally, the media should also
change the way they report such incidents to ensure proper coverage
and avoid incorrect perceptions of the events.26 Lastly, the police—as
an institution working with all races, ethnicities, genders, and socio-
economic classes—should complete an implicit bias course, mandated
by an alteration to the statute.27 With these adjustments, Section
1983 should rise from the ashes and return to its original purpose.
I. A RUN-THROUGH OF § 1983’S INCEPTION AND AMERICA’S
LONG-STANDING POLICING PROBLEMS
Police are the entry point, the gatekeepers, of the
criminal justice system. They make discretionary
decisions everyday about who is likely to commit a
crime and who should be targeted by the criminal
justice system; about who should be stopped, ques-
tioned, searched, and arrested. These decisions are
made on the basis of individual police officers’ life
experiences—their training, their instincts, their
prejudice and bias. And all too often, they are deci-
sions informed by race.
—Tavis Smiley,
The Covenant with Black America28
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604, 608, 617–18 (2d Cir. 2019).
26. See infra Conclusion.
27. See infra Part VI.
28. Xavier Pickett, Policing Black Communities, 30 PUB. JUST. REP. 1, 1–2 (2007).
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Protecting African-Americans’ newly minted constitutional rights
created a need for a statutory defense like Section 1983.29 After the
Fourteenth Amendment solidified freed slaves’ technical citizenship
and their technical representation within the government of the
United States, people needed an instrument to ensure that they
could vindicate any violation of such constitutional rights.30 Among
other determinations, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 highlighted that
any person can sue anyone else if a person deprives them of their
statutory and constitutional rights.31
The Ku Klux Klan Act created checks on the insidious outbreak
of violence by racially motivated marauders, chiefly left unrestrained
after the Civil War.32 America hoped to provide a remedy for the vi-
olation of constitutional rights and, in doing so, foster peace and
justice in the region through civil enforcement.33 Disallowing people
from participating in normal American life could now be prosecuted,
and the statute essentially opened federal courts to private citizens
in order to guard the people’s federal rights from the rogue states.34
Amos T. Akerman authored much of this statute, to the surprise
of many who know of his tumultuous history.35 Akerman, once a Con-
federate soldier, served as Attorney General in the Grant Adminis-
tration after the war.36 Once the war ran its course and the Union
soldiers declared victory, Akerman discarded his deep-seated Con-
federate ideals when creating Georgia’s new constitution, making the
prosecution of members of the Ku Klux Klan a priority of the newly
formed justice department.37 Akerman once observed that “[s]ome
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1871, Pub. L. No. 41-22, 17. Stat. 13. (summarizing that “any
person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any
State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the
United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States shall . . . be liable to the party injured in any action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . .”).
32.  See Ku Klux Act passed by Congress, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/this-day




35. See Akerman, Amos T. (1821–1880), ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.encyclopedia
.com/history/news-wires-white-papers-and-books/akerman-amos-t-1821-1880 [https://
perma.cc/83PC-9GXR] (last updated Dec. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Ackerman].
36. See id.
37. See id.
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of [those] who had adhered to the Confederacy felt it to be [their] duty
when [they] were to participate in the politics of the Union, to let Con-
federate ideas rule . . . no longer . . . ,” and he stuck with this asser-
tion.38 He went further, stating that “[i]n the great conflict, one party
had contended for nationality and liberty, the other for state rights
and slavery. We thought that our surrender implied the giving up
of all that had been in controversy.”39 He asserted these views as a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1867–1868, where he sup-
ported suffrage for African Americans despite owning eleven slaves
as a farmer in pre–Civil War Georgia.40
Akerman wanted to create a law that isolated bigots from the
rest of Southern society, essentially freezing the undesirable views
out of the Southern states.41 This legislation proved so effective that
he became overwhelmed prosecuting all those who espoused these
ideals, so he began to narrow his focus on the ring leaders of racially
motivated hate groups.42 He also successfully lobbied for and helped
establish the Department of Justice; Akerman and government
officials from this newly formed department went on to prosecute,
convict, and imprison hundreds of Klan members between 1870 and
1872.43 This work consumed Akerman; while he rejoiced at the suc-
cess of the program, he also disliked the business as it “revealed a
perversion of moral sentiment among the Southern whites” and
thought that it spelled disaster for the South.44 Akerman resigned
from his appointed position early after financial burdens grew too
great, and the Grant administration halted his prosecutions.45 Not
all of Washington shared the fervor for righting the injustices against
African Americans, and Grant acceded to those who thought Akerman
went too far.46
In contrast to Akerman’s fervent use of the statute, plaintiffs
rarely utilized this act as a sword, probably because the people who
needed it most still struggled with basic problems of surviving in
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Akerman, supra note 35.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. See Amos Tappan Akerman, AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/4212
/Akerman-Amos-Tappan.html [https://perma.cc/F4VS-LWU9] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. See Akerman, supra note 35 (noting that Secretary of State Hamilton Fish spe-
cifically recorded in his diary after a cabinet meeting that Akerman told many stories
of alleged KKK members castrating African Americans “with terribly minute and tedious
details in each case” that he thought “[i]t has got to be a bore to listen twice a week to this
same thing.” Fish embodied the callous indifference that allows atrocities continue,
despite knowing the issue exists).
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their day-to-day lives while avoiding arrests for other new charges
targeting freed slaves.47 Section 1983 mirrors the KKK Act closely,
remaining as a safeguard for everyone’s rights and privileges afforded
to them by the United States Constitution.48 Specifically, this updated
act states the following:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial offi-
cer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.49
While this provision does not solely protect the American public
from police officers violating their constitutional rights, many cases
involve a dispute with a citizen and a police officer, mainly because
more opportunities arise for police officers to disregard constitu-
tional provisions when interacting with the public as compared to
those available to most other government officials.50 Because of the
close interaction between officers and the public, Section 1983 claims
filed for officers’ conduct warrant the focus of this analysis.51
II. WHAT QUALIFIES FOR § 1983 PROTECTIONS: A CASE ANALYSIS
[T]he Constitution does not create ‘rights’ which
people carry around with them like their personal
47. Laws such as “vagrancy” appeared in places like Shelby County, Alabama and else-
where in the deep South, which punished “a person [for] not being able to prove at a
given moment that he or she is employed.” DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER
NAME 1 (2009). Such offenses targeted black men almost exclusively and sent them to
hard labor prison camps that mirrored slavery “in all but name,” particularly evident
when private prison owners bartered and sold men amongst groups of other prison
owners to fit the labor they desired. Id. at 2.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
49. Id.
50. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 661 (1978) (referencing the suit
compelling pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before medical reasons
required leave).
51. CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE
PUBLIC, 2008 5 (2011) (counting 40,015,000 interactions between the public and police
in 2008, meaning the police have 109,630 interactions with the public per day).
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effects. Rather, it provides for the creation of gov-
ernments, and places certain limitations on what
those governments may do.
—Wayne McCormack,
Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations of Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I52
Section 1983 looks good on its face but possesses a few problems
in practice. To ameliorate these issues, we must understand the cur-
rent pattern of how courts decide cases and why, starting from how
courts looked at this issue in the past. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the
Court focused on the scope of the immunity available to senior aides
and advisors of the President in a suit for damages based upon their
official acts.53 While this does not directly reflect the standard police
cases which will be the focus here, this case sets many boundaries
for how Section 1983 cases would travel through the justice system
and who gains protection from these suits in the future.54 There,
Fitzgerald alleged that the officials participated in a conspiracy to
violate his constitutional and statutory rights by aiding President
Nixon.55 Harlow, though he did not qualify for absolute immunity
from suit,56 claimed that his position as a police officer gave him the
protection of qualified immunity.57 This case illuminates the concrete
and important purpose of qualified immunity: the need to protect
officials required to exercise their discretion in difficult, split-second
choices and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous
exercise of this official authority.58
52. Wayne McCormick, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations of Judicial
Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (Jan. 1974).
53. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
55. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802.
56. Absolute immunity applies to certain government officials, including prosecutors,
legislators, and—applicable in our case—judges. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). A
judge’s actions circumvent absolute immunity only if the harm did not arise from a judicial
act. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (where a subordinate court employee claimed
the judge terminated her employment based on her sex). Stump v. Sparkman determined
a two-factor test to define “judicial act:” (1) whether judges normally perform the function,
relating to the “nature of the act itself” and (2) whether the parties dealt with the judge
in his judicial capacity, looking to the “expectations of the parties.” 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
57. Officers may plead the affirmative defense of qualified immunity to these
constitutional claims by filing a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
In order to succeed, officers must show that their conduct as a “government official . . .
performing discretionary functions . . . d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S.
at 818; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 752 (2002) (stating that the defense
“provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
58. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807 (referencing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).
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Harlow also demonstrates that defendant police officers must
plead this affirmative defense of qualified or “good faith” immunity.59
At the time of this case, the Court determined a two-step analysis in
crafting this “good faith” defense, including both an “objective” and
a “subjective” condition to gain the protection.60 The objective element
involved a presumptive knowledge of and respect for “basic, unques-
tioned constitutional rights”; the subjective component referred to
the “permissible intentions” of the officer in the stated situation.61
An official in such a case destroys the applicability of qualified
immunity if they “knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with
the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights
or other injury. . . .”62 The first test involved an inquiry into the sub-
jective malice of the officer, whereas the altered test focuses on ob-
jective, legal reasonableness of the official action in question.63 Harlow
helped determine the trajectory of Section 1983 cases moving forward.
Anderson v. Creighton delves deeper into the more specific issue
of police officer immunity from Section 1983 litigation.64 The specific
“question presented [involved] whether a federal law enforcement
officer . . . [can] be held personally liable for . . . damages” when they
“participated in a search that violat[ed] the Fourth Amendment . . .
if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported
with [that] Amendment.”65 There, FBI agent Russell Anderson and
other officers conducted a warrantless search of the Creighton fam-
ily’s home because they believed that a bank robber hid in their midst,
but the house contained no robber.66 The district court granted
summary judgment for Anderson, because probable cause existed
and exigent circumstances rose to bar the officers from securing a
warrant.67 Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed, holding that
the lower court should not have granted summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds since the right violated—the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable search of a house—was
“clearly established.”68
59. Id. at 815.
60. Id.
61. Id. (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 815–20; see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
64. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635–37.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 637.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 637–38.
758 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:749
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court that, although “action[s] for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of consti-
tutional guarantees” in cases against government officials, permitting
these suits against them can create substantial social costs, including
the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing liti-
gation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties
and negatively affect their resulting work product.69 Qualified im-
munity steps in here, shielding government officials as long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent to comport
with constitutional rights.70
Anderson also clarifies the position of the Court on the opera-
tion of the “clearly established” rule, which depends on how the
Court will apply the relevant legal principle.71 If the Court applied
the test of “clearly established law” at a high level of generality, it
would bear no relationship to the “objective legal reasonableness”
that is the touchstone of Harlow.72 Justice Scalia thought that, in
tests for “clearly established law,” plaintiffs could “convert the rule
of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”73 This
would place police officers at a ridiculous disadvantage, in Justice
Scalia’s eyes.74 He went further, announcing that:
[S]uch an approach, in sum, would destroy “the balance that our
cases strike between the interests in vindication of citizens’ con-
stitutional rights and in public officials’ effective performance of
their duties,” by making it impossible for officials “reasonably
[to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for
damages.75
The Court mentions that Anderson’s search did not cross into the
realm of objectively legally unreasonable just because warrantless
searches violate the Fourth Amendment if unsupported by probable
cause.76 Courts do not want to make the scope or extent of immunity
contingent on the precise nature of various officials’ duties or the pre-
cise character of the particular rights alleged to have been violated.77
Immunity with qualifications for different types of police work would
69. Id. at 638 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
70. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638.




75. Id. at 640.
76. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640–41.
77. Id. at 641.
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not give conscientious officials a reasonable assurance of protection
that the doctrine attempts to afford to the officials.78 The Court goes
on to conclude that they should not hold objectively legally reason-
able judgments against the individual police officers personally.79
Ultimately, the Court agreed that qualified immunity should
protect police officers who conduct unlawful, warrantless searches
of innocent third parties’ homes when searching for a fugitive.80 Scalia
argued that “security would be utterly defeated” if officials hesitated
in reacting to official police business because of the fear of being left
vulnerable by new exceptions to this protection, “without entangling
themselves in the vagaries of the English and American common
law.”81 In reality, fear of violating citizens’ rights could act to ensure
that the police behave and protect the public at large. Does there not
exist a happy medium between paralyzing police officers with the
fear of lawsuit and inspiring much needed reflection on the actions
they take? More vigorous and thorough training on how to handle
sticky situations would provide officers with ample experience, creat-
ing more comfortability with following citizens’ Constitutional rights.
Four years later, Allen v. City of Los Angeles82 set the issue of
police violence on fire, as an amateur cameraman caught Rodney
King’s brutal beating on camera and released the footage to the press
for all of America to witness.83 The appeal in question, brought by
the passenger of King’s car, arose from the “Rodney King incident”
of March 3, 1991, where Allen was forced at gunpoint to the ground,
handcuffed, frisked, placed in a police car, and questioned while of-
ficers similarly forced King to the ground and beat him for the sole
insurrections of speeding and failing to stop.84 Surprisingly, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers there and
concluded that qualified immunity applied “because they reasonably
could have believed their actions did not violate Allen’s civil rights.”85
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly justified the ac-
tions of the police, citing the search as a legitimate Terry stop,86
78. Id. at 643.
79. Id. at 644–45.
80. Id. at 644.
81. Id. at 646 (protecting officers from a too harsh rule regarding personal liability
in their professional capacity as police officers).
82. See Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled in part by
Acri v. Varian Ass’n, 114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997).
83. Video of Rodney King Beaten by Police Released, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go
.com/Archives/video/march-1991-rodney-king-videotape-9758031 [https://perma.cc/82J7
-QN8B] (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
84. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 1995).
85. Id.
86. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (utilizing the rule that the officer must have
“reasonable grounds to believe that [subject] was armed and dangerous, and it was
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because they reasonably could have believed that their conduct com-
ported with recognized law in light of clearly established law and the
totality of the circumstances.87 However, speeding in a car should
not allow for the police to force the passenger to the ground when they
are already handcuffed, especially when they had no active part in
driving the car that was speeding. Is apprehending the perpetrators
of a routine traffic violation enough of a public interest to justify the
interference of the police into the realm of unconstitutionality? And
when is the desire for police effectiveness going too far by allowing
officers too much discretion to decide what is reasonable and who
they maim with that discretion? The Court has left these questions
unanswered to this day.
Eighteen years had passed before the Pearson v. Callahan
decision, where officers conducted a warrantless search of the respon-
dent’s house after an undercover informant voluntarily named the
house in question as a location for the sale of methamphetamine.88
The court of appeals held that summary judgment on qualified im-
munity grounds did not apply for the officers in question, because the
respondent cited facts to support a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.89 The court also determined that the unconstitutionality of
the officers’ conduct was clearly established.90
Three years after Pearson, Shelly Kelly in Messerschmidt v.
Millender obtained police protection in order to move out of her
apartment shared with her ex-boyfriend.91 The former boyfriend still
approached and fired at her with a sawed off shotgun while she at-
tempted to relocate.92 She reported this incident and documented his
previous violent nature and his connection to a gang.93 The detective
confirmed this testimony and “drafted an application for a warrant au-
thorizing a search of the Millenders’ home for all firearms and ammu-
nition, as well as evidence indicating gang membership” in response
to this information.94 The magistrate granted the application, and the
police conducted a search, which was later objected to as an unrea-
sonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.95
necessary for the protection of [the officer] and others to take swift measures to discover
the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized”).
87. Allen, 66 F.3d at 1054 (citing Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315,
1319 (9th Cir. 1995)).
88. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
89. Id.
90. Id. (basing this qualification on the procedure mandated in Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 209–10 (2001)).




95. Id. at 535–36.
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The Court highlighted the overbroad nature of the categories of fire-
arms, firearm-related material, and gang-related material, and it
ruled that the warrant and subsequent search violated the Fourth
Amendment.96 However, the Court also granted the officers qualified
immunity.97 To violate the Fourth Amendment and negate the possi-
bility of qualified immunity, the Court related that the warrant must
have been “based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,”98
because the magistrate controls whether the facts reach the thresh-
old of probable cause to issue a warrant.99 However, the Court found
that the officers could have reasonably thought that probable cause
supported the scope of the warrant, therefore allowing qualified
immunity protections.100
A few years later in City & Cnty. Of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
the Court also ruled that qualified immunity protected officers from
liability for the injuries they caused to Sheehan.101 Sheehan lived in
a group home for individuals with mental illnesses, where she began
to act violently towards her social workers.102 The home called the
officers to help escort her to another facility for temporary evalua-
tion and treatment, but Sheehan threatened to kill them when they
entered her room.103 In order to subdue her, the officers sprayed her
with pepper spray and then shot her multiple times when the spray
did not subdue Sheehan.104 She later sued two officers in their per-
sonal capacities, claiming that they violated her Fourth Amendment
rights.105 The officers, again, enjoyed the shield of qualified immunity
because the law they violated was not clearly established, giving
“government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mis-
taken judgments.”106 Although their training highlighted that they
must accommodate those with disabilities, the court decided that
the failure to follow their training does not itself negate qualified
immunity where it would otherwise be warranted.107
The discussion of qualified immunity reached a head when a
judge in the Eastern District of New York strongly opposed its
96. Id.
97. Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 536.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 537.
101. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1769 (2015).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1770.
104. Id. at 1171.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1774 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)).
107. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777.
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application in a recent case from Tucson, Arizona.108 Officers re-
sponded to a call about a woman acting erratically with a knife.109
Hughes had been seen hacking at a tree with the knife earlier in the
day, and officers observed her approach another woman on the scene
with this same knife.110 Officers asked twice for her to drop the knife,
and, although she did not acknowledge the presence of the officers
or acquiesce to dropping the weapon, she remained calm through-
out.111 Officers shot Hughes four times for holding a knife, maintain-
ing that they subjectively believed Hughes endangered the woman
and that Hughes seemed somewhat distressed.112 The Court of Ap-
peals first held that the record was sufficient to show Kisela violated
the Fourth Amendment with his conduct, and that it constituted a
“clearly established” violation because “the constitutional violation
was obvious and because the Circuit precedent” was “analogous.”113
The Supreme Court reviewed this decision and, after citing Tennessee
v. Garner,114 refused to determine whether Kisela violated the Fourth
Amendment and granted him qualified immunity in this case as the
conduct did not violate clearly established law.115
Notably, Justice Sotomayor delivered a scathing dissent to this
decision.116 She mentioned that Hughes retained her composure when
the officers arrived, stood a full six feet away from her roommate
outside of their apartment, had not committed any illegal act, and
did not raise the knife in the direction of anyone in the area, least
of all the police officers on the scene.117 In fact, other officers on the
scene stated that they “wanted to continue relaying verbal com-
mand[s],” that they did not feel violence was yet appropriate.118 Re-
gardless of other mitigating factors that pointed to more verbal cues,
Kisela believed that Hughes posed enough of a danger to the officers
to use deadly force by shooting her four times, “without giving . . .
warning that he would open fire . . . leaving her seriously injured.”119
Justice Sotomayor called this conduct “unreasonable” and opined that
108. See Feuer, supra note 19.




113. Id. (citing Kisela v. Hughes, 862 F. 3d 775, 785 (2016)).
114. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (stating that “[w]here the officer has
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by
using deadly force”).
115. Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1152.




2020] SECTION 1983 & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 763
the Court misinterpreted “the facts and misapplie[d] the law, effec-
tively treating qualified immunity as an absolute shield” to liability
regardless of conduct.120 Unfortunately, the majority of the Court did
not share her view of the facts, and qualified immunity took one step
closer to absolute immunity enjoyed by judges and prosecutors.121
A few months later, the court headed by Judge Weinstein in the
Eastern District of New York decided Thompson v. Clark, which
emulated how he believed the doctrine of qualified immunity should
apply to officer cases.122 Camille Watson called dispatch and re-
ported that Thompson had abused her two-week-old niece based on
some red marks on her buttocks.123 A set of cops attempted to enter
the house and conduct the search without the search warrant, which
Thompson vehemently denied to give consent to.124 He attempted to
block the officers’ path into his apartment, but the officers began
beating him.125 The officers also claimed that he flailed his arms
excessively to prevent them from successfully placing the handcuffs
on his wrists.126 They then took the child from the apartment to check
for signs of abuse, which did not exist beyond red marks indicating
diaper rash.127 The court ultimately dismissed the child abuse charges
against Thompson, but he brought this subsequent action in re-
sponse to the conduct of police at his house.128 In the ensuing opin-
ion, the court recognizes qualified immunity’s tumultuous history
and application with the courts, citing it as inherently contrary to
the initial purpose of Section 1983.129
The court recognizes that frequent defenders of constitutional
rights lash out against qualified immunity with each new excessive
force case the courts encounter.130 The opinion specifically points to
120. Id.
121. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1148.
122. Thompson v. Clark, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105225, at *36 (EDNY 2018).
123. Id. at *7.
124. Id. at *8.
125. Id. at *9.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Thompson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105225, at *10.
129. Id. at *16 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)) (stating the purpose
of Section 1983 as existing “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority
to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims
if such deterrence fails.”); see also Jon O. Newman, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the
Police: Sue Them for Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/opinions/heres-a-better-way-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23
/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-d6005beac8b3_story.html [https://perma.cc/FJV3-XV3A].
130. Thompson, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105225, at *16–17 (citing Press Release,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF), Statement on U.S. Supreme
Court Decision Expanding Qualified Immunity for Police (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www
.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-statement-qualified-immunity-decision-eastern-district-new
-york) (stating that “The Supreme Court’s decision [in Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148
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Harlow, which decided that while officers acting with malicious in-
tent or intentional subversion in mind would fall under this statute,
those who did so in a case where they did not violate “clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known” would walk free.131
The trajectory highlighted above summarizes the current state
of Section 1983 and the immunities that bar relief from violations
of civil rights. The outcome here differs markedly from how the origi-
nal statute meant to apply to constitutional and statutory cases. In
the inception of this law, the legislature intended their creation to
protect the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
adopted after the conclusion of the Civil War. These Amendments
deny the ability to own slaves, highlight equal protection and due
process under the law as applied to the states, and protect the right
to vote when faced with condemnation based on race.132
As we move further away from the original legislative history
of Section 1983, the Court and lower courts have forgotten the true
protective purpose of the legislation.133 With new case law blunting
the edge of the Section 1983 sword, we risk completely invalidating
the law as we know it. Change must come for this legislation to sur-
vive and live out its true purpose, as promulgated in the history of
the statute.
III. QUICK AND DIRTY OVERVIEW OF ANALYZING SECTION 1983
CASES: HOW TO CITE THROUGH AN EXCESSIVE FORCE CASE
But what is government itself, but the greatest of
all reflections on human nature? If men were an-
gels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal
controls on government would be necessary.
—James Madison,
Federalist No. 51134
(2018)] serves to expand qualified immunity for police officers to an unprecedented and
dangerous degree, becoming, as Justice Sotomayor aptly noted in her dissent, ‘an abso-
lute shield for law enforcement officers’ and ‘gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth
Amendment.’ As the nation continues to mourn the recent deaths of [citizens] at the
hands of police, we remain concerned that this ruling will undermine efforts to hold law
enforcement officers accountable for their use of excessive force, which has led to the
tragic loss of too many innocent lives”).
131. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
132. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
133. See supra Part II.
134. James Madison, Federalist Papers No. 51, B. RTS. INST. (1788), https://billofrights
institute.org/founding-documents/primary-source-documents/the-federalist-papers/fed
eralist-papers-no-51 [https://perma.cc/2JYT-B8UU].
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When a grievance by a state actor occurs, a plaintiff must file
the case in a specific way in order to have a prayer of surviving sum-
mary judgment, let alone succeed in court. The statute of limitations
for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims originates in the state law where the con-
stitutional tort occurred, meaning that the client must file before the
time demonstrated in the state the violation occurred.135 Next, a
plaintiff must turn to the direct language of the law. Under § 1983, a
plaintiff can sue a person acting “under color of” state law for violat-
ing their rights secured under the Constitution or statutory law.136
Acting “under color of” state law means the state enabled or empow-
ered the actor to do the job; it does not require the conduct to be legal
under state law.137 Employment by state or local government gener-
ally suffices to determine a state actor, establishing police officers
and judges as state actors easily in most cases.138
Next, plaintiffs must determine: (1) if these actors violated their
rights, (2) which amendments constitute the most textually relevant
ones, and (3) what defenses could exculpate the defendants from
liability.139 Section 1983 requires the usual Twombly140 and Iqbal141
standard of pleading, meaning the factual allegations in the com-
plaint must plausibly make a case of liability. Subsequently, the
defendants will usually move for summary judgment, but courts
must accept the plaintiff’s version of events as fact unless corrobo-
rating video exists directly contradicting their story.142 Summary
judgment hinges on whether a rational jury could find for the non-
moving party; if it could, summary judgment is not appropriate.143
These qualifications limit which claims plaintiffs can plausibly raise
in the Section 1983 context.
Moving forward in the legal process, qualified immunity specifi-
cally does not require the court to find a violation of the plaintiffs’ con-
stitutional rights first.144 Courts determine the “clearly established”
135. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). However, when the Section 1983 action
accrues, federal law determines the limitations period. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S.
6 (1981) (holding that the claim accrued when plaintiff learned he was to be fired, not
when Chardon was actually terminated).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
137. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
138. Id.
139. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
140. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (1955) (stating that the complaint
must contain enough factual material to support the claim asserted).
141. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (1937) (determining that a complaint will only
survive a motion to dismiss if it alleges nonconclusory facts that, taken as true, state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face).
142. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
143. Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 204 (2014).
144. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009) (striking down the sequential
requirement from Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) and Saucier v. Katz, 533
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factor by examining the law at the time of the wrongful action instead
of the time of the court decision date.145 Unfortunately for plaintiffs,
the Supreme Court has maintained that judges should not define
“clearly established law” with a high “level of generality,” clarifying
that, for qualified immunity to apply, the right must be “particular-
ized,” or “[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.”146 Allowing retrospective liability would eviscerate the
requirement of notice at the core of qualified immunity. As a matter
of policy, courts do not second-guess the split-second judgment of
officers merely because that judgment caused harm.147 If a court finds
that a constitutional right has been violated and that the right was
clearly established, then qualified immunity cannot protect a state
actor from their wrongful acts.148
IV. RE-EVALUATION OF § 1983: WHEN “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED”
ELIMINATES THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS AS WE KNOW THEM
The right to be let alone—the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
—Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis,
Olmstead v. United States149
As the analyses of current case law and the summary of filing
a possibly efficacious Section 1983 claim demonstrates, succeeding in
this realm and holding bad actors accountable proves exceedingly dif-
ficult. While the purpose of allowing police officers to make quick de-
cisions without undue worry of prosecution remains a valid and
noble aim of qualified immunity, we must decide when an officer
has reached the realm of “undue”—versus solely taking necessary—
precautions in an employment that all but requires the use of
deadly weapons.
Good intentions here may not be good enough. As Daniel Web-
ster preached, “[g]ood intentions will always be pleaded for every
assumption of authority. It is hardly too strong to say that the Con-
stitution was made to guard the people against the dangers of good
U.S. 194 (2001) of establishing a violation first before analyzing whether the law was
clearly established).
145. Id.
146. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987).
147. McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (1994) (referencing Slattery v. Rizzo, 939
F.2d 213 (1991)).
148. See id.; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635.
149. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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intentions.”150 He goes on in his writing, discussing the proclivity of
“men in all ages who mean to govern well, but they mean to govern.
They promise to be good masters, but they mean to be masters.”151
We have to hold our police officers to a higher standard. Although
good intentions do not always secure citizens’ rights, this motive
quite outweighs the alternative of intentionally created rights vio-
lations. The most concerning cases arise out of pure bias against
specific police targets based on race, gender, socio-economic class, or
even previous interactions with law enforcement generally. Despite
this overarching thought, bias and malintent currently do not allow
for successful Section 1983 suits in America.152
Another important issue arises in the manner of deciding clearly
established law. In order to see whether something qualifies as
clearly established for the officer, a judge must “slosh . . . through
the factbound morass” in the case at hand, and just a slight difference
in facts of the case as compared to a decided case could disqualify it
as being a clearly established law.153 Section 1983 was conceived of in
order to protect the citizen’s rights, and this cannot be denigrated.
Multiple possible solutions exist to this issue, but the legislature
and the courts would need to create these alterations together.
A. The Efficacy of an Exclusionary Rule
An exclusionary rule has the potential to work as an alternative
or a sword with Section 1983 to enforce this act and promote justice.
The exclusionary rule, unique to American law, describes the principle
that evidence seized by police in a situation where a Fourth Amend-
ment violation occurred may not be used in trial for any reason.154
Mapp v. Ohio confirmed this and ruled by a majority of six that evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, prohibiting “unreasonable searches and seizures,”
may not penetrate into the realm state courts.155 This established
that the federal exclusionary rule forbidding the use of constitution-
ally obtained evidence in federal courts also applied to the states
150. CHERYL K. CHUMLEY, POLICE STATE U.S.A.: HOW ORWELL’S NIGHTMARE IS BE-
COMING OUR REALITY 36 (2014) (quoting Daniel Webster’s speech delivered at Niblo’s
Saloon in New York on March 15th, 1837, as found in EDWIN WHIPPLE, GREAT SPEECHES
AND ORATIONS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 393 (2006)).
151. Id.
152. See Newman, supra note 129.
153. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
154. Exclusionary Rule, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/exclu
sionary-rule [https://perma.cc/XSM6-6DWU].
155. Brian Duigan, Mapp v. Ohio, ENCYC. BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com
/event/Mapp-v-Ohio [https://perma.cc/EKF5-9BDW].
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through the incorporation doctrine, referring to “the theory that most
protections of the . . . Bill of Rights are guaranteed [to apply to] the
states through the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,” prohibiting the “states from denying life, liberty, or property
without due process of [the] law.”156
If this rule applied to the conduct of police officers, any type of
action by the officer that did not conform to the enumerated consti-
tutional rights and the subsequent case law would be persecuted in
a Section 1983 litigation. Critics of qualified immunity would enjoy
this avenue as it all but obliterates the concept of qualified immu-
nity, throwing the protections afforded to our police officers to the
wind.157 Because of this bright line deletion of the protections that
may allow officers to safely complete their jobs, the alterations to
Section 1983 litigation should focus elsewhere.
Qualified immunity does still exist for the important purpose of
allowing split-second decisions and actions to occur in some of the
most trying situations that any American would have to deal with
in their lines of work.158 At the same time, other individuals whose
jobs involve life-threatening, quickly made decisions also suffer from
litigation when things go array, specifically physicians in emergency
situations who then face medical malpractice litigation if the patient
or next of kin believes a mistake occurred.159 Because of this remain-
ing uncertainty, we must continue to search for better alternatives
to how qualified immunity applies to cases without completely
eviscerating the protections for our officers.
B. Could Sanctions Work?
As a more doable option, we could impose sanctions via newly en-
acted statutory provisions in order to curtail these violations. The
eleventh Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for attorneys provides a tem-
plate for a new sanction law to be created in this realm.160 However,
this Rule of Federal Procedure only attaches if Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b)
156. Id.
157. See Evan Bernick, It’s Time To Limit Qualified Immunity, GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
BLOG (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/public-policy-journal/blog/its
-time-to-limit-qualified-immunity [https://perma.cc/DF8B-FSGF].
158. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see also Allen v. City of Los
Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 1995).
159. See Medical Liability and Malpractice, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS. (Mar. 20, 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-liability-and-mal
practice.aspx [https:perma.cc/899P-CKSU].
160. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 11(c)(1) (stating that “[i]f, after notice and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may
impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule
or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be
held jointly responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee”).
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has been violated in a calculable manner.161 While these sanction laws
focus on attorneys’ downfalls and seek to ameliorate those issues, a
new statute could emulate this tenor for police officers. For example,
in Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11(b)(1), the mirrored statute for police officers
could refer to police action conducted “for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation.”162 Other sections of statutes could, likewise, abound by
taking the words meant to apply to lawyers and applying them to fit
armed officers. If attorney work can produce situations where sanc-
tions apply, so too do the life-threatening actions of armed officers.
C. Why Strict Liability Will Not Work
Other critics of Section 1983 have mentioned strict liability upon
the city or municipality employing the state actor when a constitu-
tional violation occurs as a viable and effective option.163 Strict liability
exists whenever a defendant proves liable for committing an action,
regardless of what their intent or mental state was when commit-
ting the action.164 In criminal law specifically, possession crimes and
statutory rape both exemplify strict liability offenses.165 If the mu-
nicipalities could shoulder the liability of officers when a constitu-
tional violation occurs, this could theoretically shield the officers
from worrying in the moment about right from wrong, while simul-
taneously pressuring municipalities to train officers to the utmost
of their abilities to ensure that violations do not occur to drain their
pockets. Additionally, this could incentivize the public to refrain from
filing frivolous suits, as the cash out from this litigation would end
up coming from the taxpayers’ pockets.
161. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 11(b) (“Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court
a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will
likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation
or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.”).
162. Id.
163. Kristen Clanton, 8.3 Damage Claims Against Cities and Counties Under Section
1983, FED. PRAC. MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATT’YS, SHRIVER CTR., http://federalpractice
manual.org/chapter8/section3 [https://perma.cc/MM6H-8EVX] (last updated 2013).
164. Strict Liability, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_liabil
ity [https://perma.cc/UCM4-J57X].
165. Id.
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Five issues prove deadly for this seemingly good fix of the de-
fense of qualified immunity. Firstly, taking the pressure off police
officers may open up the floodgates of litigation because they feel as
though they do not need to ponder the correct way to approach a dif-
ficult situation. Less thought into police officers’ actions could lead to
gratuitous rights violations, ultimately meaning more suits and an
eventual suffocation of our legal system with Section 1983 strict liabil-
ity cases. Secondly, municipalities may conduct cost-benefit analyses
on the benefit of training officers versus the cost of litigation, possibly
finding that the cost of training officers actually outweighs any cost of
litigation that could occur from police misconduct. This, again, would
not disincentivize bad behavior, as we hope Section 1983 would.
Alternatively, if municipalities accept this strict liability princi-
ple and train accordingly, more suits may still be filed as plaintiffs
may look at this as the new “slip-and-fall,” easy-money legal scheme.
Furthermore, the fact that the money would originate from taxpayers’
pockets may not deter the bulk of the Section 1983 litigation cases
filed, as most of these come from Eighth Amendment violations from
prisoners, who do not currently pay taxes.166 Finally, a fundamental
fairness issue exists in requiring the friends and family of those
abused at the hands of the system, not in an Eighth Amendment
context, to pay through taxes for the police misconduct that injured
them. At first, strict liability may sound like a feasible option to ensure
that constitutional rights remain protected, but a shift to strict liabil-
ity may cause more problems in this system than currently exist.
D. From Judge to Jury: “Clearly Established” Shift
Another possible option may exist in shifting the decision in
this matter from the judge ruling on summary judgment to the jury
as a precursor to the actual trial or in the main trial itself. The
argument here stems from uneasiness on where the judicial loyalty
lies.167 People see that judges, prosecutors, and police officers work
together in many matters, making people unsure about allowing the
judge—and possible friend of the officer—free reign to decide whether
or not the case can even get to trial.168 This solution would erase
that bias issue while also ensuring that decisions would fit with the
166. See Actionability of Negligence Under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533 (1978).
167. See Emily Saul, Ex-cops Accused of Raping Teen Ask Judge to Order Special
Prosecutor, N.Y. POST (Jan. 15, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/01/15/ex-cops-accused-of
-raping-teen-ask-judge-to-order-special-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/7DTX-SDSP].
168. See Ties that Bind, GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us
-news/2015/dec/31/ties-that-bind-conflicts-of-interest-police-killings [https://perma.cc
/GPM9-VQWB].
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current climate of society. The issue here includes the possibility that
a layperson would not have the ability to make this decision with
their knowledge base. While this would encourage people to operate
based on how their gut responds to acts of violence against civilians,
this would produce wildly different outcomes with different demo-
graphics present in the jury box.169 Also, making the layperson respon-
sible for these decisions eviscerates the hope that police officers
could use current case law to inform their decisions, because the lay-
person usually does not stay informed of new cases, unless blasted
by the media. Officers would, instead, have to gauge the general affect
of American citizens as a whole to come to a conclusion, which would
prove decidedly impossible to see through. Unfortunately, a jury would
likely not fix this issue.
E. Establishing Constitutional Violations: Where the Solution Lies
Another issue arises in that a judge can easily cop out of mak-
ing a decision on whether something will count as a constitutional
violation for future cases.170 The judge can determine that the in-
cident did not include a clearly established law and legally dismiss
it without determining whether it would have violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights if the police were on notice.171 Failing to deter-
mine this aspect effectively ensures that a case never survives past
summary judgment, as it will never become law and, therefore, not
clearly established.172 This may impact different municipalities
unevenly and further substantiates the issue.173 Because of this
ability to dismiss without creating case law on whether the facts
will now give rise to a clearly established violation, the law becomes
stagnant and does not advance to better our law enforcement and
society at large.
1. The Flaws of Returning to Old Law
Courts could follow Saucier’s guidance to first analyze whether
a constitutional violation occurred, instead of skipping to whether the
right at issue was “clearly established.”174 The failure to first address
169. See Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 171, 180 (2007).
170. See Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (showing a judge skipping past the
constitutional violation question and only answering the “clearly established” question).
171. Id. at 1153.
172. Id.
173. D. Trubek et al., Civil Litigation Research Project: Final Report, Part A, at I-58,
I-72 (1983).
174. Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified
Immunity, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1249 (2015).
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the constitutional question is an avoidance of the court’s “essential
function of explaining and securing the protections of the Constitu-
tion by failing to inform law enforcement officers, among others,
which practices are constitutional, and which are not.”175 For exam-
ple, some scholars have thought that,
free from Saucier, overworked judges may want to take the ‘short
route’ instead of dealing with the merits of a case. This creates
future costs. Judges constantly taking the easy way out in one
area of the law creates a situation where ‘civil rights questions
go repeatedly unanswered.’ This becomes a cycle where a consti-
tutional violation need not be answered ‘because the law is un-
clear, and the law is unclear because the violation continues to
go unaddressed.’176
If returning to Saucier creates complications, courts could look
to change the application of qualified immunity instead. It has been
suggested that courts return to the standard expressed in Hope v.
Pelzer, which defined “clearly established law” at a high level of gen-
erality.177 The key inquiry becomes, in this analysis, whether officers
are on “notice their conduct is unlawful.”178
The two above suggested fixes to the process of finding a constitu-
tional violation may each contain flaws, as they return to old law.
Returning to old law negates any reasons why the legal system has
moved away from those precedents in favor of something, seemingly,
more beneficial. Because of this, a new solution to the “clearly estab-
lished” issue warrants a new beginning for handling Section 1983
cases.
2. Following the Second Circuit: The Resolution
The Second Circuit recently heard and decided Cugini v. City of
New York, which may hold the solution to many woes regarding
modern Section 1983 litigation.179 The plaintiff here, Donna Cugini,
alleged a federal claim for excessive force against Officer Palazzola
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.180 Officer Palazzola
arrested Ms. Cugini in conjunction with a complaint of domestic
175. Id.; see also Michael Silverstein, Rebalancing Harlow: A New Approach to Quali-
fied Immunity in the Fourth Amendment, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495, 522 (2017).
176. Silverstein, supra note 175, at 522 (referencing Thompson v. Clark, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 105225, *30–31 (EDNY 2018)).
177. Id. at 519.
178. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 740, 739 (2002).
179. Cugini v. City of New York, 941 F.3d 604 (2d Cir. 2019).
180. Id. at 607.
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stalking and harassment, brought by Ms. Cugini’s estranged sister.181
As a result of a temporary detention and forceful handcuffing, Ms.
Cugini suffered serious bodily injury, including permanent nerve
damage to her wrist.182
During the original handcuff placement, Ms. Cugini said “ouch,”
and her body shuddered; Officer Palazzola did not loosen the cuffs
but, instead, tightened them and said “don’t make me hurt you.”183
However, the substandard removal of the cuffs actually caused Ms.
Cugini to suffer the injury at hand.184 During removal of the cuffs,
Officer Palazzola allegedly tightened the cuffs further instead of
loosening them for removal, then tugged at them excessively while
they remained tight around Ms. Cugini’s wrists.185 Eventually, an
officer called for another officer to remove the cuffs.186 After her re-
lease that day, Ms. Cugini immediately went to the hospital, where
she “began experiencing [increased] pain, numbness, and twitching
in her arms.”187 She continues to suffer from permanent nerve damage
and, as a result, cannot perform many basic household functions.188
According to the district court, Officer Palazzola enjoyed qualified
immunity “because [Ms.] Cugini gave only brief physical and non-
verbal manifestations of her discomfort while handcuffed,” meaning
that she “failed to alert Palazzola sufficiently to her distress.”189
On appeal, Ms. Cugini contended that the district court wrongly
dismissed her claim of excessive force, so the appeals court looked to
case law on Fourth Amendment violations to verify the decision.190 To
determine whether officers used excessive force, the court looked to the
balance between the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interests and the
government’s countervailing interests, such as “the severity of the
crime and whether the suspect poses a safety or flight risk or resists
arrest.”191 A plaintiff must also demonstrate that they made the
officer reasonably aware that the force was excessive.192 “A plaintiff
satisfies this requirement if” either (1) “the unreasonableness of the
181. Id.
182. Id. at 608.
183. Id. at 609.
184. Id. at 609–10.




189. Id. at 607.
190. Cugini, 941 F.3d at 607.
191. Id. at 608 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
192. Id. at 608–09 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015))
(“[O]bjective reasonableness determination must be made ‘from the perspective of a rea-
sonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time.’ ”).
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force used was apparent under the circumstances, or” (2) “the plain-
tiff signaled her distress, verbally or otherwise, such that a reasonable
officer would have been aware of her pain,” or (3) both occurred.193
The appeals court found that “the Graham factors weig[hed]
decidedly” in Ms. Cugini’s favor, as: (1) “the crime . . . [was] relatively
minor”; (2) no indication existed that “she posed a safety threat”
because of her voluntary surrender; and (3) “she did not try to flee
or resist” the handcuff attempt.194 As such, “a reasonable jury could
find that the severity of Palazzola’s intrusion—continuing to tighten
the plaintiff’s handcuffs after she expressed physical pain and using
force strong enough to cause her permanent injury—was unjusti-
fied.”195 The court further states that a reasonable officer should
have known that this force exceeded necessary force in the situa-
tion, establishing a Fourth Amendment violation.196
The appeals court next turned to the issue of qualified immunity,
assessing whether “ ‘under clearly established law, every reasonable
officer would have concluded that [the defendant’s] actions violated
[the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights in the particular circum-
stance presented by the uncontested facts and the facts presumed
in [the plaintiff’s] favor.’ ”197 In order to analyze this in context, courts
“consider Supreme Court decisions, [the court’s] own decisions, and
decisions from other circuit courts.”198
These decisions determine that handcuffing is not per se unrea-
sonable, but tight handcuffing can give rise to a constitutional viola-
tion.199 However, because the analysis must be “particularized” to the
facts of each individual case, the legal issue here focused on “whether,
at the time of Cugini’s arrest, clearly established law required an offi-
cer to respond to a complaint by a person under arrest where, as here,
that person exhibited only non-verbal aural and physical manifesta-
tions of her discomfort.”200 The court compared Shamir v. City of New
York to Arroyo v. City of New York where, in the former, the plaintiff
did make verbal complaints and showed officers the effect of the tight
handcuffs and, in the latter, the plaintiff never made any complaints
193. Id. at 608 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 386).
194. Id. at 613–14.
195. Id. at 614.
196. Cugini, 941 F.3d at 615.
197. Id. (quoting Brown v. City of New York, 862 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2017)).
198. Simon v. City of New York, 893 F.3d 83, 92 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 746 (2011) (“[Q]ualified immunity is lost when plaintiffs point either
to cases of controlling authority in their jurisdiction at the time of the incident or to a
consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not have
believed that his actions were lawful.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See Cugini, 941 F.3d at 615.
200. Id. at 616 (following the particularized standard of Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
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at all.201 Because Ms. Cugini’s case fit squarely between those two
previous standards for analyzing handcuffing-based excessive force
claims, the court found that a reasonable officer might not have
been on notice of excessive force where only nonverbal distress to
handcuffs was indicated.202 Therefore, the appeals court affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the case on qualified immunity grounds.203
However, Ms. Cugini’s case ends this trend.204 The court decides
that, although Officer Palazzola might not have been on notice of the
constitutional violation, every other officer is from this decision for-
ward.205 The court establishes that “officers can no longer claim . . .
that they are immune from liability for using plainly unreasonable
force in handcuffing a person or using force that they should know is
unreasonable based on the arrestee’s manifestation of signs of distress
on the grounds that the law is not ‘clearly established.’ ”206 This is sig-
nificant because it creates clearly established law where there was
none before, allowing such claims to make it to the courtroom instead
of failing on summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds.207
After looking through case law and projecting the costs and bene-
fits of other solutions, I propose that other courts should follow the
Second Circuit’s lead in future cases that may involve qualified im-
munity as a defense. Future courts should provide a roadmap for fu-
ture cases to determine if the specific facts should give rise to a
constitutional violation, even if such facts previously did not create a
constitutional violation. Determining that certain force now qualifies
as a clearly established constitutional violation both protects officers
from suit where they were not on notice of violations, while also
protecting the public where such cases have occurred previously, but
failed solely due to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds. This
solution requires courts to take a more active role in creating the
case law, but it will heighten the transparency and perceived equity
of how courts look at these cases in the future. It also ensures that the
law, as well as police officers’ actions, evolves with the times and
201. Id. at 616–17; see Shamir v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 553, 555, 557 (2d Cir.
2015) (inferring a handcuffing-based excessive force claim where the complaint alleged
that the plaintiff did make verbal complaints, repeatedly asked that the handcuffs be
loosened, complained that the handcuffs were “really tight” and “really hurt,” and showed
police officers his “really discolored,” “really swollen” hands) (internal quotations omitted);
cf. Arroyo v. City of New York, 683 F. App’x 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of
summary judgment for defendants on handcuffing-based excessive force claim where
plaintiff “alleged no physical injury and never asked for the handcuffs to be removed”).
202. Cugini, 941 F.3d at 616–17.
203. Id. at 618.
204. Id. at 616–17.
205. Id. at 617.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 617–18.
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stays modern to protect everyone’s rights. Requiring courts to estab-
lish law, even in cases where qualified immunity is currently appro-
priate and the court orders summary judgment, should become the
future of excessive force cases to ameliorate some of the most pressing
issues in Section 1983 litigation.
V. POLICE BRUTALITY COLORED BY RACE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STATUS: AN ADDITIONAL SOLUTION TO THE EPIDEMIC
Forget dogs: do people distinguish between being
stumbled over and being kicked?
—Alice Ristroph208
As Paul Hoffman demonstrates, “the problem of police abuse in
[this] nation’s cities is longstanding.”209 He further proffers that the
video of Rodney King’s beating provided proof that the ideal of justice
equally through all races, genders, and socio-economic classes proved
to be a part of utopia.210 However, the lack of accountability demon-
strated by the United States justice system was already obviously
established by this time, as only three cases involving police brutal-
ity were actually prosecuted in a ten-year period between 1981 and
1991.211 As dictated by Hoffman, “the King video compelled a visible
federal response to police brutality in Los Angeles.”212
Geoffrey P. Alpert and William C. Smith discuss the odd role that
the police play within our society of having the ability to use both psy-
chological and physical force upon citizens as a part of their day-to-
day employment.213 They also demonstrate a discord between how
police view the force they dole out versus how citizens view that
same force; citizens much more frequently characterize force as
208. Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law: State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353 (2008) (creating a play on words by referencing “even
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked”).
209. Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Federal
Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1456 (1993);
see, e.g., Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem & Modern Democracy
535, 535–37 (1944); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUSTICE 26 (1961) (“[P]olice brutality
in the United States is a serious and continuing problem in many parts of the country”);
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 299–307 (1968).
210. Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1456.
211. David Freed, Federal Prosecutors Usually Keep Hands Off, L.A. TIMES (July 7,
1991), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-07-07-mn-3081-story.html [https://
perma.cc/ZGK6-YFNZ].
212. Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1457.
213. Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man?,
85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481 (1994).
2020] SECTION 1983 & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 777
unnecessary, unsurprisingly, since each party approaches the situa-
tion with their own mindset at the forefront of their analysis.214
They also relate that “[t]he targets of police abuse are almost always
lower class males, and the most common factor associated with
abuse is disrespect shown to the police by these suspects.”215
Hubert Williams, the president of the Police Foundation and
former Chief of Police of Newark, admitted that “[p]olice use of exces-
sive force is a significant problem in this country, particularly in our
inner cities.”216 Since the King beating until at least 1993—just as
before the King beating—the problem of police abuse in minority com-
munities has remained a major public controversy in a number of
cities, including New York, Miami, Washington, D.C., and Detroit.217
As articulated by police chiefs and scholars alike, prejudice and
discord continue to play a role in policing, despite strides made in
protections for such groups.218 The only true way to fix these inherent
insensitivities within certain members of our society involves train-
ing them to be better. Bias and insensitivity training exposes people
to ideas they may never have encountered before, asking them to
think critically about innate biases and offering evidence of how such
innate biases can negatively impact the people they encounter in
their line of work.219 In professions that work with the entire spec-
trum of human existence—including people of all races, genders,
socio-economic statuses—we should mandate the completion of sen-
sitivity courses referencing each of the above situations. Professions
who work with a variety of people include police officers, doctors,
lawyers, and teachers, to name a few. By instructing influential people
in these professions about situations that may not have mirrored their
own, biases can begin to dwindle.220
However, as with most influential change, the mountain that is
‘inherent biases’ would need time to properly erode from the constant
wave of new knowledge approaching.221 Many cities and municipali-
ties have begun working with these bias training centers already,
214. Id. at 482–83.
215. Id. at 483 (citing ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 147 (1971)).
216. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT
OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, I (1991) [hereinafter the CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION
REPORT].
217. See, e.g., Doron P. Levin, Detroit Suspends Policemen in Fatal Beating of Motorist,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/07/us/detroit-suspends-police
men-in-fatal-beating-of-motorist.html [https://perma.cc/82TY-KATN].
218. CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 216, at iii–iv.
219. Diana Yates, Police Training Institute Challenges Police Recruits’ Racial Biases,
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with varied success.222 One more notable study occurred with New
York City police officers.223 The police officers took a higher educa-
tion ethics course made specifically for them, conforming to the
following restrictions and theories:
[Critical Race Theory] pedagogy aims to help students overcome
“color-blind” thinking, which minimizes awareness of racism, by
raising their critical understanding of racism and framing it as
a pervasive and institutionalized reality that everyone has a re-
sponsibility to change. Using the Color Blind Racial Awareness
(COBRA) Scale, critical awareness in three cluster areas, white
privilege, institutional discrimination, and blatant racism, is
measured among those completing the ethnic studies course and
a comparison group of officers completing a different college
course for police. Conclusions reflect on the impact of the course
on students’ awareness of racism, the correlation of identity and
awareness of racism, the hypothetical impact of such awareness
in policing and possibilities for future research.224
While I am awaiting responses in regard to these trainings, I
assume the ethics course for police officers produced at least some
changes to the biases some officers hold. I believe that applying this
model might be costly on the front end, but would save cities money
and time litigating cases where bias played a role. I also believe that
employing such a model would create a level of understanding, within
the law enforcement community, of those in society that they might
not have appreciated before taking this course.
VI. MEDIA IMPACT ON FORCE CASES: MAKING THE PROBLEM WORSE
The media as an institution must disseminate ideas and ensure
that the public engages with the politics of their state.225 However,
coverage of certain topics can hinder public engagement and expedi-
ent resolution of cases, specifically between the general public and
the officers that should serve and protect us.226
In an ideal situation, the media and the police force would work
together to inform society on current crime events in order to keep
222. The state of Illinois has its own Police Training Institute, which trains police
recruits from about 500 different departments across Illinois. Id.
223. Avram Bornstein, et al., Critical Race Theory Meets the NYPD: An Assessment of
Anti-Racist Pedagogy for Police in New York City, 23 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 1 (2012).
224. Id.
225. Juan Liu, The Role Of Media In Promoting Good Governance And Building Public
Perception About Governance: A Comparison Of China And The United States (Jan.
2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State University) (on file with author).
226. Alyce McGovern & Nickie D. Phillips, Police, Media, and Popular Culture,
OXFORD RES. ENCYC. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. (Aug. 2017).
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the public safe.227 That relationship turns on its head when the
police may be involved in the issue. Information on how the police
interact with their community is invaluable, but the way this infor-
mation reaches the public matters.228 Eighty-one percent of officers
believe that the media treats the police unfairly in reports.229 Many
news articles sensationalize police interactions with the community,
because such language creates more interest in their news, meaning
more business for them specifically.230 What they may not realize is
that sensationalization changes how the public sees the subject of
the article and, in turn, the relationship between police and the
public.231
A strong example of this media issue comes from the Mario
Ocasio Case from New York City’s Bronx borough. The case at hand
involved an emergency call about an emotionally disturbed person
who had taken K2, a synthetic form of marijuana which has notori-
ously caused serious medical issues with those who have taken it.232
Ocasio’s girlfriend called emergency services when Ocasio demon-
strated adverse side effects and threatened her with a pair of scis-
sors.233 However, as seen in the original report from 2015, the focus
does not fall on the threatening gestures and excessive aggression
caused by the K2 that necessitated more force than a normal para-
medic call, but instead on an alleged “cover up” that police suppos-
edly designed immediately after Ocasio’s death.234 Even though this
227. Katrin Hohl, The Role Of Mass Media And Police Communication In Trust In The
Police: New Approaches To The Analysis Of Survey And Media Data (Sept. 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics) (on file with the author).
228. Id. at 90.
229. John Gramlich &. Kim Parker, Most Officers Say the Media Treat Police Unfairly,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/25/most-of
ficers-say-the-media-treat-police-unfairly [https://perma.cc/F648-QYQC].
230. Kristina Adams, How the Media Uses Language to Manipulate You, WRITER’S
COOKBOOK (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.writerscookbook.com/media-uses-language-ma
nipulate [https://perma.cc/7DAQ-8WQ6].
231. Suzan I. Wadi & Dr. AsmaaAwad Ahmed, Language Manipulation in Media, 3
INT’L J. ON STUD. ENG. LANG. & LIT. 16, 21 (July 2015).
232. K2 Drug Facts and Statistics, WHITE SANDS TREATMENT, https://whitesands
treatment.com/addiction-articles/rehab-center-advice/k2-drug-facts-statistics [https://
perma.cc/BU8R-K43U]. While K2 should imitate the effects of THC, the synthetic form
of the drug is increasingly more dangerous than naturally growing marijuana, causing
irregular heartbeats, psychosis, unexpected aggressive behavior, or sudden stroke.
233. Thomas Tracy, Jury Tosses Federal Wrongful Death Lawsuit Against Cops Who
Tasered Man Threatening Girlfriend While High on K2, DAILY NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-jury-tosses-federal-wrongful-death
-suit-20200214-blv773dsrzgq5kqw2mjzlf5hla-story.html [https://perma.cc/97J4-EVHT].
234. Victoria Bekiempis, Lawsuit: NYPD Withholding Evidence in Alleged Taser Death,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.newsweek.com/nypd-police-involved-death-taser
-new-york-police-department-382325 [https://perma.cc/KB8A-7ZAT].
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article mentions briefly that their information originates in the com-
plaint filed by Ocasio’s mother, the article mainly reads as though
it is fact: as though the NYPD truly murdered this man and then
proceeded to hide evidence that would confirm this fact.235
The resulting jury trial occurred in February 2020 and resulted
in a complete defense verdict: the jury cleared all five cops of all
charges.236 This verdict comes not in small part because a K2-induced
heart attack—not actions of the cops—caused this man’s untimely
death, but a reader would never know this possibility from the first
article from 2015.237 I proffer that this mismatch in the story spun
by the media and reality aids in furthering the rift between police
and the community. Newsweek also has not followed up on their origi-
nal article to correct public perception about the officers or NYPD as
a whole. A Daily News article alone reported on the culmination of
this trial, and even they both sensationalized the title to receive
more views and incorrectly reported on some of the pertinent infor-
mation of the case. For example, the title only appears as “Jury
tosses federal wrongful death lawsuit against cops . . . ” when seen
on search engines, serving as clickbait for the public.238 They also
falsely reported this as a “wrongful death lawsuit” when it instead
focused on possible excessive force, as the K2-induced heart attack
decidedly caused Ocasio’s death.239
All of these false and overstatements in the media do not run
without repercussions. Recently, an armed aggressor ambushed two
police officers in two separate occasions in assassination attempts.240
Surveillance video shows a man walking into precinct headquarters,
ducking around a corner to then return with a gun drawn in attack
against the officer.241 As Mayor Bill de Blasio asserted, “this was an
attempt to assassinate police officers. . . It was a premeditated effort
to kill.”242 Police Commissioner Dermot Shea then specifically
blamed criticism of police and demands for criminal justice changes for
creating an atmosphere that fails to discourage attacks on officers.243
235. Id.
236. Tracy, supra note 233.
237. Id.
238. Mario Ocasio K2 NYPD, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search?q=mario+oca
sio+K2+NYPD&rlz=1C1GCEA_enUS867US867&oq=mario+ocasio+K2+NYPD&aqs=
chrome..69i57.5471j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 [https://perma.cc/59M7-QTA9].
239. Tracy, supra note 233.
240. Josh Bacon, 2 New York Officers Shot in ‘Assassination Attempts;’ Trump Rips






2020] SECTION 1983 & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 781
He also said that, “words matter and affect people’s behavior,” which
highlights that the media can change police-community interactions
as well as reduce the safety of armed officers.244
The influential role that media plays in community outreach
causes a necessity within the public to receive their unbiased report
to form opinions on this matter.245 “With great power comes great
responsibility.”246 This is especially true here. The media’s role may
require the imposition of limits on how this information can be por-
trayed to the public. Instead of sensationalizing the story, articles
should be required to limit the adjectives they use that may incite
anger or distrust between officers and the public.
Censorship concerns would most definitely arise with any sug-
gestion at changing the way the media reports on such cases.247 Such
an idea implicates the people’s First Amendment rights of freedom
of speech, while also unearthing the negative views associated with
the “Big Brother” atmosphere of censorship in China.248 I am most
certainly not advocating for total censorship of our media; on the
contrary, I know that the media must report on these matters. How-
ever, I believe that honest and ethical reporting about the interactions
between police and the public is absolutely essential to promote
trust and further good experiences between these two entities, and
such opinions have been verified in recent events. Media outlets
should make it a priority to factually report on such matters and
scan for sensationalization of excessive force cases.
CONCLUSION
Section 1983 began as a sword against racist practices in a
post–Civil War era, and it is time to resharpen our blades through
fixing the current state of this statute. This sentiment of protection
through the threat of aggression can act as a strong deterrent to
unnecessary police action when used correctly. However, we must
244. Id.
245. See Hohl, supra note 227, at 90.
246. The origin of the quote seems to be hotly contested. Most know the phrase as one
from Voltaire or the popular Spider-Man comic book, but sources have unearthed this
phrase from as early as the French Revolution in 1793, found in a few decrees made by
the French National Convention: “They must consider that great responsibility follows
inseparably from great power.” With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2015/07/23/great-power [https://perma.cc
/42TZ-6QCN].
247. Biena Xu & Eleanor Albert, Media Censorship in China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china [https://perma.cc/6P9T
-5CPx] (last updated Feb. 17, 2017).
248. Id.
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alter this law to accord to our current needs. The law is not a stag-
nant lake but a moving, flowing river of ideas and solutions to
American society’s current issues. We have been taught to revise,
revisit, relearn throughout our legal careers, and now it is time to
apply this sentiment to a dated statute in need of reviving.
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